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This article discusses the socialmobility of combatants and introduces the notion of
circular return to explain their pendular state of movement between civilian and
combatant life. This phenomenon is widely observed in eastern Democratic
Republic of Congo (DRC), where Congolese youth have been going in and out of
armed groups for several decades now. While the notion of circular return has its
origins inmigration and refugee studies, we show that it also serves as a useful lens to
understand the navigation capacity between different social spaces of combatants
and to describe and understand processes of incessant armed mobilization and de-
mobilization. In conceptualizing these processes as formsof circular return,wewant
to move beyond the remobilization discourse, which is too often connected to an
assumed failure of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration processes. We
argue that this discourse tends to ignore combatants’ agency and larger processes of
socialization and social rupture as part of armedmobilization.
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Introduction
Armed groups and armed mobilization have gained increased attention in the
study of civil war. Debates on the proliferation, incentives, strategies and dis-
courses of armed groups have inspired different subfields of study including the
political economy of war, governance and political order-making in conflict-
affected areas, and rebel governance (Schlichte 2009a,b; Adam et al. 2017;
Kasfir et al. 2017; Malejacq 2017; Bultmann 2018; Ka¨ihko¨ 2018; Krieger 2018).
A growing number of studies also focus on those joining armed groups, on their
individual sense making, navigation and social mobility, and on their return to
their communities of origin (Richards 1996; Peters and Richards 1998; Weinstein
2006; Hoffman 2011; Debos 2016) Similarly, the disarmament, demobilization,
and reintegration of combatants have been studied in detail, as well as strategies
and interventions facilitating these processes (Cilliers 1995; Humphreys and
Weinstein 2007; Theidon 2007;De Vries and Wiegink 2011; Muggah and
O’Donnell 2015; Honwana 2017).
Failed reintegration and protracted security challenges are presented as key
explanations why ‘recycled rebels’ (Vogel and Musamba 2016) feel entrapped in
a constant cycle of mobilization, demobilization, and remobilization. Existing
literature tends to analyse this cycle mostly from a security perspective. We
know little about individual combatants’ incentives and agency and about larger
processes of socialization and social rupture as part of armed mobilization, this
despite its determining impact on return processes to civilian life. Perazzone (2017)
concludes for the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) litera-
ture in the Congo for instance that it ‘tends to focus on disarmament and macro-
analyses of the country’s DDR and Security Sector Reform (SSR) as a whole’, yet
‘fine-grained empirical studies of ( . . . ) practical reintegration processes remain
limited’ (Perazzone 2017: 256).
Analysing the example of eastern DRCongo, this article wants to contribute to
a better understanding of combatants’ mobility and analyses the individual return
to armed combat. It looks particularly at themobility of rank-and-file combatants
rather than their commanders, and at their capacity to navigate between different
social spaces. In line with Moore (1973) and Bourdieu and Waquant (1992), we
consider armed groups as such spaces, or as relatively autonomous domains of
activity that are in constant interaction with their larger social environment but
have their own set of rules, structure, relationships, and hierarchies defining and
informing the behaviour of their members and the relationships between them.
We introduce the notion of ‘circular return’ to explain combatants’ navigation
between such spaces of civilian and combatant life. We argue that a focus on this
circular return of combatants helps us to move away from a macro-analysis of
armed mobilization and to contribute to a better understanding of the persistence
of armed group proliferation and mobility in eastern Congo. This mobility is
inspired by a multitude of incentives, ideologies, factors, and processes that go
beyond dominant arguments about failed reintegration processes, the protection
narrative, or ‘Big Men’ mobilization efforts in search of an increase in their
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bargaining power (Utas 2012). (Ex-)combatants’ readiness to return to combat is
largely influenced by former experiences. These experiences explain not only the
appeal of return but also the different difficulties ex-combatants face when trying
to reintegrate into their home communities or elsewhere.
We stress that to understand this circular return between social spaces, (long-
term) armed mobilization should be understood as a process of socialization. The
presence of armed groups is to be considered a moment of social rupture as much
as an experiment in constituting new social spaces, a newway of life, a new formof
social and symbolic capital, and eventually a new identity. Ex-combatants’ con-
sequent capacity to navigate between different spaces largely defines their re-
sponse to political or security dynamics, to mobilization and demobilization
campaigns, or to their own individual challenges and ambitions. While Vigh
(2009) defines social navigation (which includes a routinization of movement)
as a conceptual tool to capture mobility within a social formation that itself is
moving and changing, we define it as mobility between different social spaces or
spheres of action. Joining armed groups are as much a way of making sense of
changing realities as a response to security threats or mobilization efforts.
Young combatants’ pendularmovement in and out of armed groups is guided by
a complex of motives, and individual and collective incentives. Armed groups pro-
vide an alternative social space, which simultaneously imposes and offers a newway
of life, social, symbolic and economic capital, protection, forms of belonging, and a
new identity to its members. As one combatant in eastern DRC confirms,
I really liked the respect I enjoyed in the armed group.My family respectedme too. I
also had a good collaboration with the local authorities. Added to this are some
advantages such as the ability to recommend someone to an organization for job
opportunities (interview #22 with ex-combatant, Nzibira, July 2018).
It helps to explain why, as our data show, that despite the hardship of recruit-
ment, being a member of armed groups in some cases is considered a more at-
tractive option than returning home:
what I appreciated when being part of the armed group, was the respect, the com-
posure training, and the new relationshipswe canbuild. I hadno real concerns, I had
money and I had a lot of relations ( . . . ) I did not like returning home, missing my
own freedom when being in the armed group (interview #20 with ex-combatant,
Nzibira, July 2018).
As social spaces, armed groups produce their own sets of rules, values, and
resources that cannot easily be converted to civilian life. Armed mobilization
particularly redefines the social and symbolic capital that helps to structure com-
batants’ habitus (Bourdieu and Waquant 1992). Returning to their home com-
munities, in many cases, results in a relative loss of the capacity to mobilize these
capitals, as is illustrated by the marginalization and frustration often experienced.
Return to combat, in this sense, is a reclaim to what was lost as a consequence of
demobilization.
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This is particularly visible in the case of eastern DR Congo, where since the
early-1990s, local youth has joined rurally based armed groups, rebel movements,
or local defence forces, both during and after the CongoWars (1996–97 and 1998–
2003). Attempts to disarm and demobilize these groups have had limited effect,
and armed structures have shown strong resilience to peace deals and DDR
efforts. Demobilized combatants often decide to return to their armed comrades
or respond to opportunities provided by newly created ones, and to navigate
between their position and role of armed actor and civilian. Being combatant
provides the opportunity to use both roles simultaneously. Navigating in and
between different social spaces has become a persistent condition of life of
many combatants and is guided by a complex interplay between social and pol-
itical dynamics, collective needs and grievances, and individual interests. Not
everyone prefers to remain in this state of pendular mobility though. Those
who received considerable advantages as part of reinsertion programmes usually
tend to prefer not returning to the armed group they have been with. However, a
new security challenge easily triggers next rounds of mobilization despite having
received reinsertion kits. The case of the Raya Mutomboki armed group, which
again started operating as a result of a direct security threat to local communities
and caused a massive enrolment of new and former combatants, illustrates this
complexity of interactions between civilian and combat life. While many of these
‘new’ recruits did not tend to return home once the security threat disappeared,
they kept close links with their families and local society at large.
Other cases seem to confirm the difficulty of combatants in cutting the links
with their former comrades and commanders. This can be because of strong
pressures of rebel commanders, leading to ‘forced circular return’, or can be a
result of shifts in the security context and the consequent need to protect the
community, revealing a persistent state of readiness of ex-combatants. It can
also be out of frustration with the limited benefits and results of reintegration
into society and the difficulties to return to civilian life. Or it can be out of nos-
talgia with the material and social advantages of combatant life, explained by one
combatant as ‘kukula kwa bure’, or the habit to ‘eat well without toomany efforts
required’. In the Ruzizi Plain (South Kivu), for instance, combatants preferred to
keep their combatant position and wanted ‘to be like General Bede Rusagara’, a
very influential armed group leader who had been successful in making fortune
out of combat and was considered a role model.
In this article, we investigate these different dynamics explaining circular return
and mobility between social spaces of combatants in South Kivu, located in east-
ern DR Congo. The research draws on extensive and long-term fieldwork by the
authors in the region, and on more recent interviews between April and August
2018 with combatants, ex-combatants, local authorities, civil society members,
youth associations, and host communities in Buzi, Kalonge, and Bunyakiri
(Kalehe territory), Nzibira (Walungu), Nzovu andKigulube (Shadunda territory)
the Ruzizi Plain, and Bukavu, all located in South Kivu. Data were gathered
through ethnographic methods, including individual and focus interviews, obser-
vations, and informal conversations. In Bukavu and Kinshasa, also interviews
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were conducted in 2019 with governmental and non-governmental organizations
involved in DDR processes. The article starts with a conceptual discussion on
circular return and mobility between social spaces. It then presents a historical
overview the dynamics of armed mobilization in eastern Congo. It is followed by
an assessment of the different DDR programmes, which were developed in the
Congo since the formal start of the peace processes in 2003 and explains the
limited impact these programmes have had on armed mobilization. It finally
presents an in-depth analysis of how combatants constantly navigate between
different social fields.
Circular Return and Mobility between Social Spaces
Recently introduced concepts such as ‘circular migration’, ‘circular mobilities’,
‘split return’, or ‘recycled refugees’, all recognize themobility ofmigrant or refugee
populations and point at the repeated migration experiences between an origin
and a destination, involving several departures and returns (Hugo 2013). While
this circularmigration as part of humanmobility is not a new phenomenon, it only
recently received wider recognition. Today, there is a growing literature (including
policy documents and statements) that focuses on this form of mobility, yet little
agreement exists on its definition.Schneider and Parusel (2015) for instance under-
stand circular migration rather broadly as ‘a flexible form of repetitive movement
between different destinations’. Displacement literature equally recognizes the
prevalence of a persistent condition of mobility of internally displaced people
and refugees, described a ‘pendular mobility’ or ‘circular return’. In conflict envi-
ronments, pendular mobility points at mobility as a way of life or as a permanent
strategy to seek for security and protection. It also includes the daily return to
what are considered safer areas to spend the night, which is omnipresent in
conflict-affected rural areas in eastern DR Congo.
Similar patterns of pendular mobility can be identified among members of
armed groups. A constant cycle of mobilization–demobilization–remobilization
as observed in eastern Congo, both point at the persistence of drivers of mobil-
ization and the failures of demobilization and reintegration efforts. This cycle has
been documented at large, and several reasons explaining it have been discerned
(Utas 2005; Theidon 2007; Nussio 2011; Wiegink 2013), including the persever-
ance of unresolved conflict dynamics; the proliferation of a rising number of small
armed groups, contributing to a fragmentation of the military landscape; the
growing involvement of low-level political actors in armed mobilization leading
to a democratization of militarized politics; failures of demobilization and reinte-
gration efforts; and disruptive military responses (Vlassenroot and Verweijen
2017).
A rich literature on ex-combatants and their mobility in post-conflict settings
has documented cases including El Salvador, Sierra Leone,Mozambique, Liberia,
Colombia, Burundi, and the DR Congo (Theidon 2007; Christensen and Utas
2008; Wiegink 2013; Fririksdo´ttir 2018). Most analyses label the pendular mobil-
ity of combatants, or the continuous mobility between combatant and civilian
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spaces, in terms of remobilization. It is commonly agreed that combatants, despite
demobilization and reintegration efforts, often risk being remobilized and to re-
turn to the bush and rejoin their former comrades, or adhere to alternative armed
groups. Alternatively, combatants can respond to calls from politicians or other
Big Men who strategically rely on ex-combatants and other marginalized youth
for their own (political) campaigns, a phenomenon described by Christinsen and
Utas (2008) as ‘politricks’. And in still other cases, ex-combatants are considered
responsible for persistent levels of insecurity because of their involvement in
organized crime and crime networks after the war has ended or their
demobilisation.
All of these scenarios incited the need forDDRprogrammes, which are assessed
a crucial part of peace-building strategies. ForWiegink (2013: 3), who studied the
case of RENAMO inMozambique, these programmes start from two misleading
assumptions. One is that ex-combatants would naturally want to return “home”,
without taking into consideration what home is and how it has changed during the
war. The second assumption is that armed groups are seen mainly as military
structures that can easily be dismantled, ignoring the fact that they also entail a
web of social relationships. As the case of Sierra Leone illustrates, war-time mo-
bilization networks tend to continue after the termination of conflict (Utas 2005).
The same can be said about the networks of solidarity and support between ex-
combatants. The example of RENAMO shows that ex-combatants do not simply
fade away but continue to be an important identity in post-war politics and society
(Wiegink 2013).
These cases illustrate how armed structures remain an option to those who have
left them even after the formal end of war. While the return to armed struggle is a
‘profoundly multi-layered and social process’ (Wiegink 2013: 10), so is the indi-
vidual decision to take part in it. The narrative of remobilization, however,
obscures the complexities explaining it. It ismainly understood in terms of a return
to violence and combat, itself the result of ‘an interaction between entrepreneurs
of violence, military affinities, intermediaries, and selective incentives’ (Themner
2013). More importantly, it pays little attention to the agency of those being
mobilized, the larger social processes and context leading to a return to armed
combat, the effects of long-term membership of armed groups, and the socializa-
tion process this membership entails.
Vigh (2009) introduces the notion of social navigation as an analytical starting
point to understand the intersection between agency, social forces, and change.
This concept helps to unravel the interactivity between the way social agents wove
within social formations and the way these social formations move and change
over time themselves. This ‘motion within motion’ tells us about ‘the relationship
between the environment people move in and how the environment itself moves
them, before, after and during the act’ (Vigh 2009: 425). In uncertain conditions,
mobility thus cannot be understood without looking into the shifts in the larger
social context itself. It is not only a reaction against but also conditioned by these
shifts and is expressing an attempt to ‘disentangle from confining structures, plot
an escape and move towards better positions’ (Vigh 2009: 419). Joining armed
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groups, in this sense, thus could be read as a search for a better position caused by
social flux and change. As we will illustrate below, also a return to armed groups
can be considered as a search for an environment that feels more predictable, feels
more ‘at home’, and gives a better access to different forms of capital than the
home community itself, which is experienced as a strange place because of changes
happened during absence. Circular return, in this sense, is not only a search for
opportunity but also a reaction to an increased sentiment of estrangement.
This merging of two different forms ofmovement (one of social formations and
one of agents within these changing social formations) partly builds onBourdieu’s
understanding of the interplay between agency and social force (Bourdieu and
Waquant 1992). Vigh distances himself, however, from Bourdieu’s notion of the
social field for it ‘implies a stability and demarcation of social structure that
corresponds poorly to the reality of changeable and emergent social environ-
ments’ (Vigh 2009: 427). We agree with Vigh’s critique on Bourdieu’s perspective
on movement and the slowness of habituation; and rather than being limited to
vertical movement within an existing field, movement indeed can also happen
between different fields or social spaces, as combatants’ circular return tends to
confirm. Vigh over-emphasizes the volatility and change in social formations in
conflict settings though and thus neglects their resilience to what he identifies as
determining processes of entropy and instability. As the case of eastern Congo
reveals, societies seem to be much more stable in conflict environments and speed
of change less dramatic than assumed, despite turmoil and high levels of insecur-
ity. Hoffmann andVerweijen (2018) argue that in conflict-affected easternCongo,
existing structures do not merely disintegrate but are constantly being reproduced
by new actors and in new social spaces. Registers giving meaning and structuring
these spaces do not disintegrate or disappear in war contexts but are constantly
being reproduced by those resisting them. The same can be said about matrices of
perception and practices of government. Despite the reduction or even disappear-
ance of state authorities, these practices show a remarkable level of resilience.
In line with this, Schlichte (2009a: 17) points at the constant interactions be-
tween armed groups and the larger social environment and describes armed
groups as figurations, or ‘smaller social settings, groups and less structured col-
lectives, and as ensembles of interdependent individuals ( . . . ) linked by asym-
metric power balances, as they exchange favors or commodities, as they maintain
emotional ties, and even as they fight’. These balances are rather precarious and
volatile because of acts of consent and contestation but also the persistent action
of actors.
These figurations resemble what Moore describes as (emerging) semi-
autonomous social fields. In our analysis, we rely on Moore’s concept to under-
stand armed groups and combatants’ mobility between these groups and society.
Similar to Bourdieu, for Moore, semi-autonomous fields are social spaces that
have ‘rule-making capacities, and themeans to induce or coerce compliance; but it
is simultaneously set in a larger social matrix which can, and does, affect and
invade it, sometimes at the invitation of the persons inside it, sometimes at its own
distance’ (1973: 722). We consider armed groups as such fields and want to
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understand how rules and regimens—in interactionwith larger society fromwhere
they originate—create structure, generate power to obtain compliance and at the
same time create a form of belonging. This attachment between the combatant
and the armed group helps to construct identity, place, solidarity, etc.With Shariff
(2008), we agree that the concept of social field can be considered both a unit of
analysis and a normative order and thus has an analytical as well as an empirical
value.
Boundaries between these fields, in our case between the armed group and the
wider society, are processual and depend on the capacity to generate rules and
coerce or induce compliance and to offer belonging, protection, security, and
material benefits. In our analysis, we consider circular return then as the mobility
of combatants between the semi-autonomous field of an armed group and their
larger social context, and being driven by a search for a less fluid and more pre-
dictable and reliable social environment. Thismobility is determined both bywhat
emerging fields can provide and by the larger social environment where they stem
from. It is the effect of a constant interaction of combatants with the same social
fields.
Mobilization and Military Fragmentation in Eastern Congo
More than 15 years after the formal conclusion of the SecondCongoWar, eastern
Congo’s military landscape remains highly fragmented and extremely volatile,
with new armed groups constantly being instituted, others disintegrating, and still
others joining forces or fragmenting into different factions. Strikingly, over the
last 25 years, the number of armed actors is showing a steady increase, this despite
an inclusive peace process introduced in 2003. Patterns of mobilization have also
shifted over time. Foreign-supported large-scale rebel movements and Kinshasa-
backed coalitions of rural-based nationalist self-defence groups, which character-
ized the Congo Wars (1996–2003), today have been replaced by over 120 largely
locally rooted and small-scale armed actors (Stearns and Vogel 2015; Vlassenroot
and Verweijen 2017).
Different dynamics explain the persistence of armed resistance andmobilization
in eastern Congo (Vlassenroot and Verweijen 2017). A first factor is the continued
presence of localized and unresolved dynamics of conflict and insecurity, mainly
centred around land access and other resources, citizenship, local power, identity
politics, and the presence of foreign rebel groups. These dynamics explain con-
tinued claims by armed actors of self-defence and protection, and over communal
rights and the right of self-rule. Such issues of contention are strongly defined and
shaped by the existing governance framework of the Congolese state and the
consequent practices of rule (Hoffmann and Vlassenroot 2014). A second set of
factors includes the different connections gradually being established between
armed groups and politico-military elites since the formal end of the Congo
Wars as part of new and highly militarized politico-military and economic com-
petition. This competition is mainly connected to electoral processes, political
representation, army reform and the access to the spoils of resource exploitation
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(Stearns et al. 2013). And finally, as will be documented in detail in the next
section, some of the effects of peace-building and state-building strategies have
contributed considerably to armed mobilization. Attempts to reverse it through
rebel–military integration, negotiations providing a share of peace-dividends,
badly designed military responses and the lack of progress in dealing with local
conflict issues, all have set in motion new claims to self-rule and to protection
(Erickson Baaz and Verweijen 2013; Vlassenroot and Verweijen 2017).
While Congo’s eastern parts have a long history of armed resistance
(Vlassenroot 2013), recent dynamics of armed mobilization find their origins in
the democratization process, announced by Zairian President Mobutu in 1990.
This process provoked intense competition between the ruling elite and emerging
opposition forces. In the then eastern Zaire, competition centred around citizen-
ship and land access and political mobilization of existing ethnic antagonism,
which eventually triggered the creation of a number of communal self-defence
groups such as theBatiri (Masisi), theKatuku (Walikale-Kalehe), and theNgilima
(Beni-Lubero).While connecting customary leaderships and agendas to new local
political networks, these groups also expressed a deep mistrust in Mobutu’s pol-
itical order. They were a symptom of a collapsing political system and order,
explaining increased political fragmentation, a deepening economic crisis, and
the breakdown of social services, including education. Faced with growing mar-
ginalization, lack of opportunities and supported by their communities, these
armed groups presented an attractive alternative to growing numbers of rural
youth. Their connection to politics and their social embeddness, gradually turned
these groups into alternative structures of protection and political and social con-
trol, with ethnic affiliation as a key marker of inclusion and exclusion (Hoffmann
2014).
The Congo Wars only further confirmed the development of these alternative
social spaces, attracting increasing numbers of (mainly male) youth. The first
Congo War, caused by the regionally supported insurgency in 1996 of the
Alliance des Forces De´mocratiques pour la Libe´ration du Congo-Zaı¨re (AFDL),
provoked the armed mobilization of rural-based armed responses to what was
experienced as a foreign occupation force. While in most cases these groups were
not able, despite their nationalistic discourse, to transcend local agendas and build
up any seriousmilitary capacity, they increasingly tried to impose their own rule in
those areas under their control. During the second Congo War, which was trig-
gered by the rebellion in 1998 of the Rwandan-backed Rassemblement Congolais
pour la De´mocratie (RCD) against President Laurent-De´sire´ Kabila, existing
armed groups revived and a next generation of groups was instituted, again out
of patriotic sentiment. Some of these groups started to develop ties to political
leaderships, business elites, and other big men, connecting them to local networks
of profit and control (Stearns et al. 2013). At the same time, their increased
capacities to generate resources and to impose their rule and induce or coerce
compliance through the establishment of administrations de brousse (bush admin-
istrations), gradually detached them from, and reconfigured their ties with their
social environments of origin.
Navigating social spaces 9
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/jrs/advance-article/doi/10.1093/jrs/feaa048/5902023 by G
hent U
niversity user on 30 Septem
ber 2020
The territories of Kalehe (South Kivu) and Walikale (North Kivu) offer an
interesting illustration of a search for legitimacy in their control over territories,
resources, and populations. In these territories, since the early-1990s, armed
groups have caused a major impact on the local political and social order. An
outburst of ethnic violence in neighbouring Masisi (North Kivu) in 1993, which
was triggered byMobutu’s democratization process and intensified struggles over
land and political representation, eventually also affected Walikale and Kalehe
and set in motion a process of armed mobilization of rural youth which has
continued until today. During the Congo Wars, these groups merged into a
well-organized politico-military Mayi-Mayi resistance structure first against the
Rwandan-backed AFDL rebel movement and since 1998 against the RCD.
Headed by Padiri Bulenda and massively supported by local youth, it was more
than just a resistance movement. It claimed the right to rule and presented itself as
a political project based on registers and symbols of stateness (Hoffmann 2014).
The movement was able to gain popular support by its reference to two issues of
existential importance to local communities: marginalization and security. As we
argued elsewhere, ‘while the former concern revolves around the historical mar-
ginalisation of local communities in politics and governance, the latter frames
local communities as in need of protection. These issues give meaning to armed
groups’ bids to local authority and legitimise their engagement in a wide range of
governmental practices normally ascribed to the state, such as taxation and the
provision of justice’ (Vlassenroot et al. 2016). For its recruits, Padiri’s armed
group also evolved into an attractive and alternative social space giving access
to social and economic opportunities, and power and providing social services in
return. In the end, the armed group increased its rule-making capacities andmeans
to induce its rule through themobilization of different sets of social, symbolic, and
political registers, while keeping (and redefining) a connectedness to the larger
social environment and an overlap with other social spaces (Hoffmann 2015).
The peace process, which formally started in 2003, had little effect on the local
politics of mobilization. Unresolved local conflicts, continuing security concerns,
and communal tensions explain the refusal of many rural armed groups to inte-
grate in the newly created Congolese army or to return to society. In addition,
former combatants who did integrate in the Congolese army kept their former
communal or territorial claims or were getting increasingly frustrated by the lack
of recognition and their growingmarginalization in the newmilitary environment.
New groups emerged and replaced disarmed and demobilized ones, while others
disintegrated into smaller-armed actors. Failed reform of the security sector and
DDR contributed to their proliferation as did new security threats produced by a
lack of army protection and the continued presence of foreign-armed groups on
Congolese territories. As a result, armed groups have gradually evolved into dom-
inant power brokers, which are deeply concernedwith ruling territory, people, and
resources. They have become part and parcel of power dynamics, have colluded
with local and national political and customary leaders, and have developed dif-
ferent techniques and strategies to impose or sustain their authority (Vlassenroot
et al. 2016; Hoffmann and Verweijen 2019).
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As part of a ‘democratization of militarized politics’ (Vlassenroot and
Verweijen 2017), local elites started relying on armed structures to reinforce their
power base and to forge access to or reposition themselves in the national political
arena. At the same time, being connected to political elites for armed groups
enhanced increased political leverage, authority, and access to resources
(Vlassenroot and Verweijen 2017). As a member of parliament confirms,
‘armed groups do not exist without the string pullers. They are at the local, provin-
cial and national level; even sometimes regional. Certain economic and political
operators derive their economic and political power and strength from these armed
groups’ (interview, national deputy, elected representative of Masisi, Kinshasa,
June 2018).
This situation is also acknowledged by state authorities, who confirm politico-
military elites’ dominant position in eastern Congo’s military landscape:
‘we know there are people who activate these armed groups. We even know some
names. But we cannot worry them so as not to create a general crisis in the country’
(Focus Group, Interior Ministry Advisers, Kinshasa, June 2018).
The particular position of armed groups in political and security dynamics is
confirmed bymore recent developments. Since the conclusion ofCongo’s electoral
process and the instalment of Felix Tshisekedi as the new Congolese president in
July 2019, armed groups are forced to revise their position. Many of them have
recently expressed their willingness to demobilize their forces and have sent some
of their combatants to assembly points in the anticipation of their reintegration.
Yet, other groups have joined forces with the Congolese army, which has started
tracking down foreign-armed groups based in Congo. Whether these dynamics
will result in a redesign of eastern Congo’s military landscape and a reduction in
the number of armed actors remains uncertain, given that links with political
networks are largely intact, sources of contention unaddressed and new reintegra-
tion efforts not very promising, explaining armed groups’ ambiguous stance
(interview # 26, Bukavu, October 2019).
Disarming, Demobilizing, and Reintegrating Combatants
The disarmament, demobilization, and reinsertion of combatants, from the start of
the peace process in 2003, have been a crucial part of peace-building, state-building,
and stabilization efforts in the DRC. Recent estimates by the United Nations
Organization Stabilization Mission in the DR Congo (MONUSCO) indicate
that so far more than 124,000 combatants have gone through different formal
demobilization programmes (Monusco 2019). While this as such can be seen as a
considerable achievement,DDR efforts have not been able to stop the proliferation
of armed groups nor reduce the level of violence in large parts of eastern DR
Congo. Even more, as argued above, the number of armed actors has only further
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increased and the mobilization of combatants further continued. Several factors
explain this lack of real success ofDDRefforts, already in 2007 depicted byBoshoff
(2007) as a ‘never-ending story’. Based on interviews with former combatants,
Richards (2016) adds that while armed fragmentation may encourage desertion
and participation in formal DDR, it can also have an opposite effect and provoke
forced recruitment or voluntary remobilization. For Perazzone,
the Congolese case shows ( . . . ) that combined with prioritising immediate security
gains, it is the generalised politicisation of reintegration that most likely impeded
coherent implementation processes (Perazzone 2017: 274).
Underlying assumptions about what should work, a lack of contextual reading
of mobilization processes and security challenges and a rather technical approach
to demobilization help to explain the limited impact of DDR in the DR Congo.
Besides the flaws in the DDR approach itself, Vogel and Musamba (2016: 3)
conclude that four factors affect patterns of continued mobilization in Congo:
‘local security dilemmas between andwithin communities; resistance by elites with
political agendas; perverse incentives for commanders; and social processes
among rank-and-file ex-combatants’.
Demobilization of armed combatants in the DRCongo started in 2004 with the
Community Disarmament and Resettlement operational programme in Ituri.
This programme, which followed negotiations between militia leaderships, aimed
at pacifying and stabilizing the district of Ituri that between 1999 and 2002 had
witnessed one of the most violent episodes of the Congolese conflict (Vlassenroot
and Raeymaekers 2004). At its conclusion in April 2005, more than two-thirds of
the estimated 15,000 combatants were demobilized voluntarily and some militia
leaders were appointed to senior posts within the Congolese army. Reinsertion
assistance was offered to former combatants, yet with limited success.
A national-level DDR programme was announced in 2003 following the sign-
ing of the Final Act of the Sun City Peace Agreement that initiated the creation of
a new integrated army and included a number of arrangements about the dis-
armament and army or civilian reintegration of signatory armed actors. The
United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the DR Congo
(MONUSCO) supports through its disarmament, demobilization, repatriation,
reintegration, and resettlement (DDR/RR) section the DDR priorities and poli-
cies defined byCongolese government. In total, 330,000 combatants were listed by
the former belligerents to be either integrated or demobilized, yet there is general
agreement that this figure was highly exaggerated to increase their share of the
peace dividend. In 2004, the formal National Disarmament and Reinsertion
Commission (CONADER) was created and, in collaboration with the Military
Integration Structure) and under the supervision of the Ministry of Defense led
Inter-Ministerial Committee on DDR, had to organize the disarmament, identi-
fication, and categorization of combatants (Vogel and Musamba 2016).
CONADER was funded by the World Bank, as part of the Multi-Donor
Reintegration Programme, which was launched in 2004 and was covering seven
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different countries in the Great Lakes Region. The CONADER-led National
DDR Programme (PNDDR) only started in 2005 and aimed at demobilization
and disarmament and at socio-economic reintegration of combatants. The pro-
gramme did not operate in isolation but was connected to larger efforts to con-
solidate peace and political and social stability and promote economic recovery.
Its approach, however, caused frustration and disappointment with former com-
batants. Reintegration was limited to the provision of a ‘reinsertion kit’ and did
not engage communities of origin in the accommodation of combatants’ return.
Incentives for DDR were also the same for all former combatants, regardless of
their ranks in armed groups. Irregularities in the distribution of benefits and in the
payment of allowances to demobilized combatants and the exclusion of those
located in remote areas further contributed to a lack of confidence in the DDR
process (Vogel and Musamba 2016). CONADER’s approach eventually also
added to the perception that violence paid off. As was the case for the different
military reintegration efforts and local peace negotiations with armed groups,
DDR was considered as an opportunity to get access to economic benefits. It
contributed to the development of a local economy of armed mobilization and a
cycle of constant recycling of combatants for economic gain.
In 2007, CONADER was replaced by the Execution Unit—Disarmament,
Demobilization and Reinsertion (UE-PNDDR). One year later, the second
DDR phase was launched, which lasted until September 2011. It was followed,
in 2014, by the thirdDDRphase, which wanted to deal with some of the pitfalls of
previous phases and invest in reintegration efforts. This phase took a year to get
implemented due to a lack of sufficient funding caused by donor reluctance. It
started with a community awareness campaign and recognized the need for com-
munal socio-economic development (Carayannis and Pangburn 2018).As part of
its civilian protection and stabilization mandate and in support of the national
DDR III programme, also MONUSCO introduced a second-generation DDR
strategy called Community Violence Reduction (CVR). In doing so,MONUSCO
wanted to move away from its previous strategy that almost exclusively focused
on security challenges and military actors. It was replaced by a community-based
strategy that wanted to reduce the level of violence and the proliferation of armed
actors in society through a more integrated approach. CVR thus was presented as
a paradigmatic shift towards a community mobilization-, engagement-, and
participation-driven approach (Monusco 2019).
Nevertheless, the DDR III phase was not able to reverse the dynamics of armed
mobilization either. By the end of 2018, in total, about 5,000 combatants, mostly
originating from the Kivu provinces (internal UEPN-DDRdocument on file with
the authors), were either demobilized or integrated into the Congolese army.
Besides direct issues related to the programme, such as the transferring of combat-
ants from their homes and the harsh living conditions in the relocation centres,
armed groups also distrusted the programme because of their opposition to the
government army and Kabila’s regime in general (Vogel andMusamba 2016). At
the same time, armed groups became more outspoken in their discourse towards
DDR. The joint strategy of demobilization and military operations created a fear
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of being completely sidelined as military actors and this without local security
dilemmas being resolved. It exemplifies that despite the adapted agenda, security
objectives were still prioritized. At the same time, DDR III has provided local
political elites with new incentives to position themselves, further politicising de-
mobilization. Recent demobilization dynamics again point at its complexities and
ambiguities and illustrate that the decision to leave the bush is guided by larger
socio-political dynamics rather than the prospects of reintegration offered bywell-
designed technical approaches.
Armed Groups as Social Spaces
In this final section, we analyse combatants’ mobility between social spaces and
their circular return to armed combat. As mentioned above, in eastern Congo
motives behind and practices of armed mobilization have shifted considerably
over time. While in the early-1990s, armed mobilization in rural areas was mostly
an effort guided by customary authorities trying to guarantee the protection of the
community and of communal land against their neighbours and during the Congo
Wars nationalist ideologies added to these motives, today armed recruitment is
determined by a complex interplay of motives, sentiments, and interests. As our
interviews indicate, these motives exceed dominant political and economic rhet-
oric and often include individual incentives. Collective and individual incentives
constantly interact, can strengthen, neutralize, or even contradict each other. At
the collective level, issues including the unaddressed need for protection, land
access and political participation have guided their proliferation. As a former
armed group spokesman testified,
‘the armed groups have real political demands which have never been resolved.
Often these revendications are sidelined and only a demobilization is offered. It
can’t solve anything. This is why it is often the rank-and-file combatants who are
demobilized. The group leaders stay or return to the forest’
(interview, Kinshasa, June 2018).
At the individual level, being a member of an armed group should be under-
stood as a search for access to opportunities and a way of making sense of a
changing social environment; a response to individually or collectively experi-
enced levels of insecurity and efforts of mobilization; and a response to what
was lost during demobilization and what is perceived as a consequent remargin-
alization. Armed groups provide an alternative to civilian life, an alternative social
space, and domain of activity. Overtime, combatants in eastern Congo have
expressed a strong navigating capacity between such spaces and their wider social
environment.
Formany combatants, armed groups today are considered a refuge to deal with
joblessness and a space of political and economic opportunity. These groups at-
tract not only the rural poor but also teachers, students, traders, etc. As one
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respondent told us, ‘armed groups are instrumentalised as spaces of transit for
those in search of responses to their needs’ (interview # 1 with civil society leader,
Kalehe, July 2018). This account illustrates to which extend individual agendas
have gradually become a key factor in the decision to (re)join armed groups and
point at the recognition of armed groups as distinct social realities, providing a
response to specific needs and offering a more predictable and reliable
environment.
However, joining an armed group is more than just a search for opportunity. It
is also about a search for belonging and identity, a response to a drastically
changing security and social context. Security concerns continue to be of crucial
importance, as is illustrated by the case of the massive mobilization of local youth
in 2011 in Bunyakiri:
‘the 2011 FDLR massacre of Kamananga which left many people dead in the
Batembo community, and the rumor of the return of Tutsi refugees in 2012, caused
a radicalisation of young people and their (re-)mobilisation into armed groups’
(interview, Bunyakiri civil society leader, June 2018).
Yet, these are not the only driver of combatant mobility, as the following
sections reveal.
Particularly those having been mobilized for a long time or from a young age,
see their presence in armed groups as a learning process having shaped their
personalities and identity. Joining an armed group is considered as entering a
new social space, with its particular rules, hierarchies, and new codes of conduct.
‘Suffering was there, but armed groups have also been a school to me. We have
learnt to be prudent before acting, we have learnt how to live in a group with people
from different ethnic backgrounds. The suffering was a school to us’
(interview # 2 with ex-combatant, Kalehe, July 2018). This is also echoed by a
combatant who told us:
‘we have learnt to stay cool, to keep our self-control’
(interview #3 with ex-combatant, Kalehe, July 2018).
Being part of an armed group, however, does not include a rupture with other
social spaces. In fact, combatants in most cases remain connected to their home
communities. This illustrates how social spaces overlap and armed groups operate
in constant interaction with their larger social environment. This is the case for
armed groups’ leaderships, who maintain direct contact with customary chiefs,
political representatives, and/or other community leaders, and also for their rank-
and-file combatants, who deploy different communication techniques to stay in
touch with their families. Where mobile phone coverage is limited, ‘ad hoc mes-
sengers’, such asmotorbike drivers, traders, or friends, are asked to passmessages,
usually informing their families about their health.And duringmilitary operations
close to their home villages, even physical visits are being made, this often without
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any harassment from local authorities or members of the home community. Some
combatants also regularly send money to, or are involved in business activities
with their families. In other cases, armed group members trade with businessmen
from their own community or have their own businesses, including ambulant
trade, motor taxis, and houses for rent. Keeping links with the larger social en-
vironment is not without risk though as these might impose security threats to
family member including regular visits from state security services.
Even if these accounts suggest that joining an armed group induces a process of
socialization and adaptation to discipline and new codes of conduct, ex-
combatants all confirm that combat life is tough and living conditions in the
bush are harsh. For some, these conditions have been a cause to demobilize:
‘I have suffered a lot while being in the militia because life was difficult. We ate
rotten beans and maize paste for several years. It is the reason why I demobilised.’
(interview # 4 with ex-combatant, South Kivu, July 2018).
Also operational and structural issues directly related to the armed group or its
command triggered combatants to demobilize. In some cases, military leadership
was considered being incompetent:
‘to be directed by someone who is not educated and does not know how to manage
combatants is disappointing. It is what I experienced in the Nyatura group with
some incompetent commanders’ (interview # 5 with ex-combatant, Kalehe, July
2018).
Others had to deal with authoritarian rule and commanders showing little will
to reconcile in case of disciplinary issues. With this conduct being guided by
military principles, there was limited space for negotiation. As one respondent
told us,
‘monoko yaMokonzi nde re`glement – the discourse of the commander constitute the
rules’ (interview # 6 with ex-combatant, Kalehe, July 2018).
Or according to another respondent,
‘kotosa sika sikoyo, kozongisa munoko te – we must obey here and now, no reply or
objection’ (interview # 7 with ex-combatant, Kalehe, July 2018).
Frustrations are not limited to leadership issues though. Some complained that
there was just not enough ‘movement’ (ambiance) within the armed group, which
was partly due to a lack of capacity of their commander to initiate and make
thingsmoving.Pointing to a discrepancy between the rationale and interests of the
combatant and of the commander, one combatant said
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‘siwezi bakia kwa commandant “Pasteur”, il faut kwenda kwenye kuko kamovement –
I could not continue in an armed group led by a “priest” (who does not offer
opportunities to the “movement” or the access resources, to pillage or to abduct
people), you have to go where the action is going, where the “movement is happen-
ing”’ (interview # 8 with ex-combatant, South Kivu, July 2018).
In other words, the armed group is considered as an opportunity for self-
realization, while the ‘ambiance’ represents the search for different forms of cap-
ital. Yet, the same structures also impose limits to combatants’ capacity to socially
navigate in the combatant space. When combatants’ agency becomes too
restricted, the only option left is to try to leave the armed group and move to a
different social space. This is not without risk, as it might be considered an act of
desertion with the consequent punishment if caught.
It explains why leaving an armed group should be considered an act of resist-
ance (against the armed group hierarchy) at the same time a claim to their own
mobility and agency. If successful, it often includes a moment of temporary de-
mobilization, either by choice or by lack of other options. Demobilization is in
many cases a strategy of transition, or the creation of a bridge to another armed
group, in the expectation of entering new social spaces offering better conditions
or benefits. As some combatants told us,
‘after having left my group as part of a campaign to demobilise child soldiers, I
joined the Nyatura thinking I would gain from it (but in vain)’ (interview # 10 with
ex-combatant, Kalehe, July 2018).
These accounts indeed indicate that combatants easily shift armed groups
(including the regular army) and demobilization is to be seen as a passage to
find new opportunities elsewhere:
‘those returningdonot easily reintegrate into the old armedgroupbecause theyhave
left for some reason, they had left some traces’ (interview # 11 with ex-combatant,
Kalehe, July 2018).
In some cases, the return to combat is inspired by new security threats but often
it is also guided by individual interests:
‘I joined the Nyatura because in the regular army I only had the grade of captain
without an occupation or salary. You feel more relaxedwhen joining a groupwhich
has some of your friends or people you know’ (interview # 12 with ex-combatant,
Kalehe, July 2018).
In other words, not only economic opportunity but also the existence of social
networks guides combatants’ mobility.
These accounts also help to explain combatants’ mobility and capacity to navi-
gate, and their readiness to return to combat despite being demobilized.
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Demobilization is often considered as a failure of self-realization. Either through
spontaneous demobilization or entering a formal DDR programme, a lot is
expected from their social reintegration. Yet, in most cases, it is leading to a
loss of what has been reached during the membership of armed groups and
even leading to what Utas describes a remarginalization. Utas illustrates how in
the case of Liberia, this remarginalization is caused by extreme poverty and lack of
economic opportunities and ismaintaining awar continuum facilitating the return
to armed groups as a strategy to deal with individual social and economic inse-
curity (Utas 2005). Also, in eastern Congo, a return to combat is often an obvious
consequencewhen the new advantages of civilian life do not respond to the expect-
ations and do not compensate what has been lost. Those having gone through a
demobilization programme and returning to combat life complain about two
major issues. First, they express frustration with what is offered with the reinte-
gration kit, which is to be considered an incentive to return to civilian life. In the
words of one respondent,
Some of the friends who had left the armed group returned to combat because they
have expectations of receivingmoney like the demobilised but these expectations are
not met, so they join armed groups (Stefano, Kigulube July 28, 2018).
Second, ex-combatants are faced with several difficulties in finding back their
place in society. Former combatants are easily targeted in case of criminal acts
happening in society, are faced with limited access to livelihoods or opportunities
in comparison to their former comrades who did not enrol, and often feel margi-
nalized or even rejected by their home society. InKalehe, a civil society leader told
us how local society easily takes revenge on former combatants in case of theft:
there are already six demobilised combatants who were killed by the population
after having been cached while stealing goods. It is not their fault, he said, as they
had no other option due the failure of the DDR3 mission (interview # 13, Kalehe,
July 2018).
Other respondents informed us that once having deposit their weaponry, legal
cases against ex-combatants are introduced by civilians in response to acts they
committed as member of an armed group:
I remember a case inMpofi, where an ex-combatantwas sent to court.Hehad stolen
pigs when being a member of an armed group and members of the villages had
decided to hunt him down.When a community is not being prepared for the return
of ex-combatants, they risk facing the settling of scores (interview # 14withmember
of civil society, Bukavu, July 2018).
While these issues inform us about some of the constraints of demobilization
efforts, at the same they point at the limits of combatants’ navigation capacities
between different social spaces. Being part of an armed groups creates new forms
of belonging and identity and access to symbolic, economic, and social capital, yet
also redefines the connections with other social spaces that complicate their return
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and integration. Keeping a legitimate presence in these spaces and navigate be-
tween their identities of (demobilized) combatant and civilian tends to be more
challenging than expected.
Conclusion
In eastern Congo, armed mobilization and the constant recycling of combatants
have become a persistent condition, illustrating the existence of a war continuum.
Combatants are in a continuous state of mobility between civilian and combatant
life and have expressed a strong capacity to navigate between different social
spaces. This social navigation cannot be fully captured when reducing the analysis
of armed mobilization to security dynamics, which indeed ignores combatants’
agency and larger processes of socialization and social rupture through armed
mobilization. Armed groups are relatively autonomous social spaces with their
own rules and procedures yet connected to their larger environment. They are
spheres of action and spaces of opportunity giving access to different forms of
capital. Incentives to join these groups have evolved over time and represent a
constant interplay between collective and individual ones. Our analysis shows that
these individual incentives go beyond the search for economic opportunity. Even
more, previous experiences in armed groups turn to be a decisive factor in their
potential return to combat after having gone through a civilian reintegration
programme. When these programmes do not compensate for what has been
lost through their demobilization or instigate a remarginalization of ex-
combattants, they tend to contribute to what we have described as a process of
circular return. This circular return points at combattants’ navigation capacity
between social spaces. It can be considered as an act of resistance against their
commanders in case of hardship or lack of ‘movement’, or against local society in
case of failed reintegration. The constantly navigation between different spaces
expresses the formation of a ‘split presence’ aimed at keeping their legitimate
presence in these spaces. So far, the different DDR approaches in the DRC
have largely ignored this navigation capacity of combatants and the socialization
effects, including the production of new identities, or armed mobilization. As a
consequence, rather than contributing to a reduction in the number of armed
groups, these approaches tend to contribute to the circular return of their
members.
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